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Abstract: The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small 
number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After 
describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could 
structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured 
in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as 
structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few 
exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and silently assumes 
temporal experience is A-ish. I then argue that temporal character is not scale invariant, 
but rather that temporal experience is A-ish at larger scales (a few hundred milliseconds 
and above), and B-ish at smaller scales. I then point out that this scale non-invariance 
opens the possibility of hybrid views. I clarify (or modify, depending on how you want to 
frame it) my own view (Grush 2005, 2007) as a hybrid view, according to which temporal 
experience is B-ish at small scales – and at this scale my trajectory estimation model (TEM, a 
version of retentionalism) applies – but A-ish at larger scales, and at the larger scale my TEM 
does not apply.  I then motivate this hybrid position by first defending it against arguments that 
have tried to show that the TEM is untenable. Since the hybrid view has TEM as its small-scale 
component, it must address this objection. I then put pressure on the main alternative account, 
extentionalism, by showing that its proponents have not adequately dealt with the problem of 
temporal illusions. The result is a new theory (perhaps characterizable as a refined version of my 
prior theory) motivated by i) explaining its virtues, ii) showing that objections to it can be met, 
and iii) showing that objections to its main competitors have not been met. 
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1 Introduction 
 
An issue of current interest in the philosophy of mind is the nature of temporal 
experience, especially the relation between the temporal features of perceptual 
experience itself, and the temporal content grasped in that experience. While 
agreement is not universal, most players in the debate take as a starting point that 
the content of perceptual experience is not limited to snapshots of null duration, but 
rather concerns events spanning temporal intervals of some appreciable magnitude. 
One motivation for this is the observation that we seem to be able to perceive 
change, including motion. And since change can manifest only over temporal 
intervals, it seems as though the content of perception cannot be of the nature of a 
snapshot, but must rather comprehend a temporal interval non-zero magnitude. 
 
What agreement there is on this point immediately dissolves to disagreement 
concerning what relation, if any, there is between the temporal content grasped in 
perceptual experience, and the temporal features of the experience itself. The main 
battle line is between approaches that try to get explanatory mileage from the fact 
that experience is (in a relevant sense) a process that evolves over time just as its 
accusatives do, and approaches that do not try to get mileage from that presumed 
fact. For now I will follow Dainton (2013) in calling the former extensionalism, and 
the latter retentionalism. There are other nomenclatures, and when the differences 
are relevant, I will discuss them.2 
 
In Section 2 I will give a brief introduction to the topic, and describe 
extensionalism and retentionalism in more detail. I will then describe my own 
(Grush, 2005) trajectory estimation model (TEM), which is in some respects a type 
of retentionalist view. In Section 3 I will do two things. First, I will argue that 
temporal experience is not scale invariant, namely, that it may have one character at 
small scales and another at larger scales. I will clarify my own view as applying only 
at small scales, which is consistent with some other account – retentionalist or 
extentionalist – holding at larger scales. Though once scale noninvariance is seen as 
an option, other hybrid views become options as well.  
 
In Section 4 I will address an objection raised by Barry Dainton (2013) against 
retentionalist views, the problem of surplus content. Though my own view differs 
from standard retentionalist accounts in some respects, it shares those features that 
render retentionalist accounts a potential target of Dainton’s criticism. I will show 
how this objection does not pose a problem at the small scale.  
 
In Section 5 I discuss the prospects for extentionalism holding at small time 
scales, since the plausibility of my view depends at least in part on the plausibility of 
the alternatives. And the main alternative is extensionalism. So I will push an 
objection to extensionalism based on temporal illusions, and show that extensionalist 
positions have not adequately met it. In Section 6 I close with a general discussion. 
 
                                           
2 Lee	  (2014)	  distinguishes	  molecular	  from	  atomic	  approaches;	  Phillips	  (2014)	  distinguishes	  views	  based	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  adopt	  what	  he	  terms	  the	  transparency	  thesis. 
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2 Overview of positions 
 
There are six positions (some of which are variants of others) concerning the 
nature of temporal perception that I will discuss, though some get more airtime in 
the literature than others. There are others I won’t discuss. The standard view is 
illustrated in Figure 1a. The bottom line represents time, the series of black squares 
just above the time line represents a sequence of real world states, and the series of 
blue squares above that represents a sequence of experiential states. The black 
arrows indicate the representation relation holding between experiential states and 
the environmental states they represent. Each experiential state at time ti 
corresponds to an environmental state at ti-d, where d is the necessary delay 
introduced by perceptual processing. The reason for emphasizing ‘necessary’ will be 
made clear in the next paragraph. On this view, the content of perceptual experience 
concerns only states of effectively null duration, though it does produce a sequence or 
stream (either discreet or continuous) of such states. 
 
The smoothing model (Rao et al. 2001) is illustrated in Figure 1b. It is similar to 
the standard model in that it claims that the deliverances of perception are contents 
corresponding to effectively durationless states of the environment. The difference is 
that there is an additional delay, over and above the basic unavoidable processing 
delay d. The purpose of this additional delay, or lag, is to allow sensory information 
concerning environmental happenings after ti to enable the system to construct a 
more accurate interpretation of what was happening at ti. This is shown in the 
diagram by the fact that the arrows showing the correspondence between experiential 
states and environmental states point farther back than in the case of the standard 
model. 
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How does such a delay help? Supose that at time t1 a baseball travels through 
the batter’s box and at the same time the bat swings through in the opposite 
direction. At time t1+d, there is information available to an onlooker’s perceptual 
system suggesting that the baseball bat directly struck the baseball. But the 
perceptual system doesn’t yet assume that that is what happened. It waits to see if 
further information will come in that might be relevant. At some point between t1+d 
and t1+d+l, (where l is the maximum lag for which the perceptual system will delay 
its processing) suppose that additional information does come in to the effect that 
the ball struck the catcher’s mitt at ti+l – perhaps the initial information included 
noise in the form of a random shadow flying in front of the batter’s box that gave 
the appearance of a ball flying off the bat. This latter state (ball in catcher’s mitt at 
t1+l) is not consistent with the former (ball struck directly by bat at t1), and so the 
earlier interpretation is relinquished. Because the perceptual system delayed its 
interpretation of what happened, it was able to take advantage of information 
concerning what happened after the event at issue to arrive at a better take on that 
event. This is obviously an advantage, but it comes at a cost, the delay. For starters, 
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it entails that, as Eagleman has described it, “We are living in the past”, and by this it 
is meant that our conscious awareness is always of events that occurred in the past, indeed 
longer in the past than the minimum necessary delay for perceptual processing. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.4. 
 
The expression ‘retentionalism’ has been used in a variety of ways in the 
literature. I will here describe it in a way that I think is at least close to center of 
mass of these views (Figure 1c). On this view, our perceptual experience broadly 
conceived of environmental events has two components: a perceptual component 
narrowly conceived, whose content is a punctate state, just as in the standard model. 
This is represented by the black arrow. But in addition to this, at the same time as 
this (narrowly conceived) perceptual state, there are a number of retentions, which 
are in some respects like memories of immediately prior environmental states. These 
are represented by the red arrows. See Dainton (2013) for more detail on this view.  
 
So the broadly conceived perceptual state at ti is a  complex of states – a 
perception (narrowly conceived) plus retentions – hence the fact that all the arrows 
in 1c originate at one experiential state.3 This complex provides to the subject at 
ti+d a perceptual experience that spans a temporal interval, namely an interval from 
ti-l to ti, where l indicates the past-directed reach of retention, and d is the necessary 
delay required for perceptual processing. The content grasped by this perceptual 
complex concerns not environmental states, but rather temporally extended processes 
(aka events, aka trajectories). 
 
My own model (Grush, 2005, 2007) is the trajectory estimation model (henceforth 
TEM, see 1d). The TEM is similar to retentionalism in that it maintains that at 
ti+d, the subject has perceptual experience corresponding to a temporal interval. In 
addition, the TEM explicitly embraces a future-oriented component (corresponding 
to Husserlian (1991) protention), and so the represented interval spans ti-l to ti+k (l, 
k ≈ 100 msec). One key difference between the TEM and standard retentionalism is 
that on the TEM, the perceptual state that constitutes the grasp of the experiential 
content is not an amalgam of multiple distinct kinds of states. Rather the TEM 
claims that there is a single perceptual state whose content corresponds to the entire 
temporal interval in question. Because of this, the TEM is perhaps more felicitously 
described as a type of what Lee (2014) calls an atomic view. 
 
A second difference – at a minimum a difference of emphasis – is that according 
to the TEM, the content represented by these perceptual states is an active 
construction, not a passive registration. Successive perceptual states could have very 
different interpretations of the environmental goings-on over a given interval. For 
example, if a perceptual state at t3 concerns the temporal interval from t1 to t5, and 
the next perceptual state at t4 concerns the temporal interval from t2 to t6, they 
overlap, meaning that each will have an interpretation of what happened from t2 to 
t5. Importantly they may differ in their interpretation of what happened during that 
                                           3	  In	  Husserl’s	  (1991)	  terminology	  the	  distinction	  was	  between	  retentions	  and	  primal	  impression,	  the	  latter	  being	  what	  I	  am	  calling	  the	  perceptual	  state	  narrowly	  conceived.	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interval – that is, the latter perceptual state my revise the interpretation that was 
produced by the earlier perceptual state. Perceptions don’t passively “sink back” into 
retention, as Husserl put it. Rather, the entire interval estimate is constructed anew 
each time (though the prior estimate is an important input to that construction, in 
most cases being something like the null hypothesis). 
 
Traditionally, because retentions are often understood to be prior perceptual 
states that are simply passively retained by the overall system (rather than actively 
constructed), there is no obvious place for revision. This isn’t to say that a 
retentionalist couldn’t work that into their account. But it is an explicit part of the 
TEM. 
 
The TEM provides the same perceptual benefit that smoothing provides, but 
without the cost of delaying. On the smoothing model, no percept is produced until 
after the delay period, and then a percept is produced that presumably will be, on 
average, more accurate because of the additional information accumulated during the 
delay. The TEM never delays the construction of a percept. But it does allow that as 
information comes in, how a prior event was interpreted can be revised. And so it 
will yield a better percept after the delay period if there is incoming information that 
warrants it – exactly as much better as, and no later than, the smoothing model gets 
with its delay. 
 
Basic extensionalism (diagrammed in Figure 1e) maintains, roughly, that the 
process of temporal perception itself is a temporally extended process, and this fact 
plays a crucial explanatory role in understanding the temporal content of that 
experience. In the diagram this is represented by the fact that a sequence of the 
arrows are blocked together in light grey, indicating that they are all parts of an 
extended sequence of states. It is because my perceptual contact with an external 
event extends across the temporal interval through which that event unfolds that the 
content of my perception has the corresponding temporal features. That is, I can 
perceive an event that spans t0 to t1 – including perceiving motion – because my 
perceptual experience itself correspondingly spans the interval from t0+d to t1+d. 
For more detail, see Dainton (2013).  
 
The smoothed extensionalist position is illustrated in 1f. It is basic extensionalism 
plus an additional delay, over and above d, added in order to produce better 
perceptual estimates. Experience still unfolds over time as with basic extensionalism, 
and this fact continues to explain the temporal contents grasped in experience, as 
with basic extensionalism. The difference is that that experience is delayed a bit. It is 
to basic extensionalism what the smoothing model is to the standard view. On this 
view, I experience an event spanning t0 to t1 because my perceptual experience itself 
correspondingly spans the interval from t0+d+l to t1+d+l. 
 
A few remarks on these models before moving on. First, all views as far as I can 
tell can accommodate either a discreet or continuous interpretation. It is often easiest 
to describe these views in discrete terms, but this should be understood as a matter 
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of expressive convenience only. I don’t believe that any of the points I discuss below 
hang directly on this. 
 
Second, in some cases, most relevantly retentionalism and the TEM, the 
perceptual states are taken to manifest over a temporal interval that is significantly 
shorter than the temporal interval that those states represent. Sometimes this is 
described as the claim that the perceptual states are ‘instantaneous’. But this is not 
a requirement. It is open to these views to maintain that these states can only 
manifest over some small interval – smaller than the interval grasped by the 
experience What is crucial is that the temporal features of the content of the 
experience are not explained by the temporal features of the experience itself. 
 
 
3 Temporal character, scale noninvariance, and the 
possibility of hybrid views 
 
There are two connected assumptions made by most of the discussion on these 
topics. The first cocnerns that I will call the temporal charatcter of temporal 
experience, and the second is that this temporal chartacter is scale invariant. What I 
mean by the temporal character of perceptual content is roughly whether the 
relevant temporal content is structured in terms of (i) past, present, future, or (ii) 
earlier than, simultaneous with, later than. These correspond to A-theoretic and B-
theoretic temporal specifications in the literature on the metaphysics of time, 
respectively. The expressions tensed, tenseless, and untensed have been used by 
Hoerl (2009), and others, and although there is some overlap in the meaning he gives 
to these expressions, is it is not complete overlap, and I don’t want to court 
confusion. So I will use the expressions A-ish [temporal content] and B-ish [temporal 
content] for this distinction. 
 
At a macro scale our experiential contact with the evolving world appears to be 
A-ish. When I am watching a sprint in the Olympics, there is a point in the middle 
of a hundred meter race when I am perceiving the runners on the track, but am no 
longer perceiving their push off the blocks, nor yet perceiving their crossing the finish 
line. I may remember the former, and anticipate the latter, but there is a clear sense 
in which neither of those is part of my current perceptual experience of the runners 
at that time. In this way, my perceptual state at this scale marks out a now that I 
am perceiving as distinct from a past that I have perceived but am no longer 
perceiving, and a future that I will perceive, but am not now perceiving. And I think 
it is plausible that the same is true of slightly briefer time scales, such as a fly ball at 
the apex of its trajectory from home plate to the center field fence — a scale of about 
2 seconds as opposed to the 10 or so for a 100 meter race.  
 
But what about smaller time scales? It is natural to think that the temporal 
character of perceptual content is A-ish all the way down to instants of effectively 
zero duration. On this view, as the temporal scale decreases, temporal experience 
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continues to be characterized by a now flanked increasingly snugly by a past and 
future. At the limt we are left with a punctate now, which serves as a pointlike 
boundary between past and future, and which constitutes the temporal content of 
perception per se. Plus or minus some quibbles this is a natural way to understand 
the standard view and the smoothing model. On retentionalist views the narrowly-
conceived perceptual component is often thought to provide the corresponding ‘now’ 
– Husserl called this “primal impression”, and it corresponds to the “now-point”.4 
Basic extensionalism and delayed extensionalism lend themselves to interpretation in 
scale-invariant terms along these same lines. An extensionalist might insist that there 
must be a span of experience of some minimal length before the result is experience, 
but whenever experience does result, the content would appear to be of an A-ish 
series of events regardless of the scale (though see Hoerl 2009). 
 
But this scale invariance is not the only option. One scale non-invariant view 
would be that the temporal character of perceptual content is A-ish  down to some 
bedrock limit, and beyond this limit there is no specifically temporal content. As we 
start slicing up temporal content, we eventually get to now-atoms of small but non-
zero magnitude whose content is not sensibly divided further. The scale here is 
probably quite small, just beneath the briefest interval over which succession and 
simultaneity judgments can be made. That is, in the vicinity of 5-20 msec or so. 
 
A more interesting scale non-invariant view would be that the temporal character 
of perceptual content is A-ish down to a certain point, and beyond that point it 
becomes B-ish. I can now clarify that my own theory is restricted in its application 
to the sub-200 msec scale, and the claim is that at that scale temporal content is 
presented in B-ish terms. No point in this interval is singled out as a now bracketed 
by a past and future. Rather, within this interval events are represented as standing 
in relations of earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. But at scales greater 
than this, this B-ishly structured interval of 200 msec effectively becomes the bulky 
now of A-ish experience. 
 
The idea that at large scales temporal experience is A-ish isn’t terribly 
controversial, so I won’t dwell on it. And the idea that there is something interesting 
about the scale of around 200 msec and less has been motivated in a couple of 
different ways. Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) isolated something like this scale on 
grounds that it is the scale at which there stops being a well-defined finish-line for 
information being propagated through the processing mechanisms of the brain. I 
singled this interval out on the basis of theoretical considerations grounded in 
temporal illusions and representational momentum (Grush 2005). 
 
But why think that at this sub-200 msec scale perceived events are presented in 
B-ish terms? One might expect an argument for this to be based on considerations 
similar to those Dennett and Kinsbourne raised concerning brief temporal scales such 
as this. In their article, Dennett and Kinsbourne leveraged the fact that the 
information processing machinery of the brain is physically extended and signal 
                                           4	  For	  example,	  he	  says	  “Primal	  impression	  has	  as	  its	  content	  that	  which	  the	  word	  "now"	  signifies”	  (Husserl	  1991,	  §31,	  p.	  66).	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propagation speeds are finite in order to argue that at short temporal scales 
perceptual processing has features unlike those recognizable at a larger scale. 
Specifically, unlike the larger scale, at the smaller scale there is no identifiable point 
in time, or spatial finish line, that can be used to define a definitive now. I think this 
line of reasoning is basically correct. But Dennett and Kinsbourne were using those 
observation for other purposes. They were trying to argue against there being a 
single set of definitive facts of the matter concerning temporal relations at this small 
scale. This is not my topic. I am here not taking a stand on whether at this temporal 
scale experience is determinate or not. Rather, my argument is that at this scale 
whatever experience does present concerning the temporal features of the perceived 
situation – determinate or otherwise, in multiple drafts or single drafts – it presents 
in B-ish terms. 
 
But here’s a line of argument that is related to the Dennet and Kinsbourne point. 
Assessing the B-ish temporal relations between external events doesn’t require an 
internal finish line. To see this consider the following toy example. There is a neuron 
in the brain that has two spatially separate retinal receptive fields, meaning that a 
stimulus presented in either of these fields results in an excitatory signal to that 
neuron. However, the magnitiude of that excitatory influence is enough to cause that 
neuron to fire only if stimuli are presented in both receptive fields at the same time. 
We have here a very simple circuit that detects simultaneity. It will fire when, and 
only when, two stimuli in the two different receptive fields are present at the same 
time. It need not keep track of time, or of what is now vs. past. There need be no 
special finish line. It simply encodes an assessment of B-ish simultaneity.  
 
Of course one can easily imagine the mechanism failing to function in this way. If 
one of the pathways from the retina to the neuron was longer/slower than the other, 
the neuron would still fire when both excitatory signals reached the cell body at the 
same time, but because of the different transit times of the two pathways, the stimuli 
would have to be successive on the retina – with the stimulus in the delayed 
receptive field appearing first – in order for the signals to arrive at the cell at the 
same time to get the cell to fire. If this asymmetric delay were a rare occurrence 
(perhaps caused by transient biological changes in one of the axons targeting the 
cell) we would have intermittent perceptual error. On the other hand, if this 
happened consistently, then either through learning or through innate wiring the rest 
of the brain would stop treating that neuron’s firing as a B-ish simultaneity signal, 
but rather as a B-ish succession or motion signal.5 
 
The upshot is that at no point does this mechanism code for ‘two stimuli in these 
receptive fields now’ or ‘one stimulus now and another just a moment ago’. The 
inputs to the mechanism take time. The stimuli were already past before the 
mechanism could do anything. Also, the signal leaving the mechanism itself takes 
                                           5	  Lee	  (2014)	  puts	  a	  mechanism	  such	  as	   this	   to	  service	   in	  a	  different	  way.	  Lee’s	  point	   is	   to	  argue	  that	   the	   representing	   of	   temporally	   extended	  processes	   can	  happen	   in	   a	   temporally	   punctate	  way	  –	  succession	   coded	   in	   a	   single	   neuron	   firing.	   My	   point	   is	   rather	   about	   the	   character	   of	   the	   content	  represented,	  not	  the	  temporal	  features	  of	  the	  representing	  mechanism.	  Though	  they	  are	  different,	  the	  points	  are	  consistent.	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time, and different amounts of time depending on which downstream processes want 
to use the output of that mechanism. If three downstream neural systems, all with 
their different transmission delays and times, want to make use of this simultaneity 
information (surely a huge underestimate), and if the information were coded in a 
tensed way, then we would need three different delay compensation mechanisms – as 
well as additional recalibration mechanisms for any communications between these 
downstream processors – in order to keep track of now and how far in the past the 
perceived events were. This is a lot of work to maintain the integrity of something 
one never really had to begin with: a ‘these are both happening now’ assessment. 
 
But if the temporal content that is carried is a B-ish simultaneity assessment, 
then this signal maintains its relevance and correctness regardless of any delays, fixed 
or variable, that it may be subject to, through any of the pathways it traverses. It is 
temporally (and hence spatially) portable in a way that A-ish content isn’t – 
precisely because its meaning does not hinge on a special reference point. 
 
A tempting initial reaction to this line of reasoning might be something like the 
following: Maybe it’s possible to get away with B-ish assessments such as this if all 
you are concerned with is sensation and perception, that is, making sense of the 
environment. But it needs to be remembered that the whole point of this is the 
control of action, that is, engagement with the environment. And when it comes to 
action, surely it is crucial to know what is happening now so that the organism can 
act appropriately. Just knowing that two events were simultaneous isn’t enough. In 
order to act appropriately with respect to them, it also needs to be known whether 
they are happening now. 
 
The temptation should be resisted. Exactly analogous points hold for 
sensorimotor coordination (at small scales) as hold for perception. What is important 
is that the baseball bat swings through the batter’s box simultaneously with the 
ball’s being at that same location. There is no now such that it is important that 
they both happen at that now, as opposed to some other now. Similarly, what is 
important is that my hand gets to the location below the vase earlier than (and 
maybe a specific temporal amount earlier than) the vase itself, so that I can catch it 
before it breaks on the floor. Whether any of this happens at any special time 
marked out as a now is irrelevant. 
 
To put it another way, sensorimotor activity is a matter of seeing to it that some 
bodily actions are earlier than (perhaps by a specific amount), later than (perhaps by 
a specific amount), or simultaneous with, other relevant bodily and environmental 
events. And just as with sensory events, specifying motor actions in terms of 
tenseless relations relieves these and other systems from the burden of having to 
explicitly track delays or compensate for them. To be sure, it is crucial that 
transmission delays are accounted for. But the point of the accounting and 
compensation is to guarantee that things that should be simultaneous are 
simultaneous, and so forth. And this can be done, and done more easily, without 
having to go at it by way of coordinating anything with a master now assessment. 
And as a matter of fact, psychophysics experiments concerning temporal happenings 
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at small scales almost always ask subjects to make assessments of simultaneity, 
succession, and the like. Subjects are never asked to assess whether a stimulus was 
presented in the past vs. future. 
 
A corollary of the implicit assumption about scale invariance is an assumption to 
the effect that with respect to temporal experience we are seeking after the one 
correct account. A denial of scale invariance opens up possibilities not explored in the 
literature. For example, the possibility that one might embrace an extensionalist 
explanation for the temporality of experience on a scale greater than a few hundred 
msec, but embrace TEM (or some retentionalist/atomist account) for the microscale 
of a couple hundred milliseconds and less. Another possibility would be a strictly 
atomist (TEM) account of what is happening at the small B-ish scale, together with 
a more traditional retentionalist view (distinguishing perception from retention as 
distinct psychological processes) at the larger A-ish scale.6 
 
This leads to the last part of my view, which is that at a scale greater than 
200msec, experience presents temporal relations A-ishly, and at that scale, a more 
standard retentionalist picture applies. In the rest of this paper, I will not argue for 
the part of the view concerning larger time scales. I will restrict my discussion to the 
small time scale, and try to argue that at least at this scale the TEM is viable, and 
that extensionalist accounts don’t seem well-suited for application at the small scale. 
I will do this by pushing arguments against extensionalism (as applied to the sub-200 
msec range) based on temporal illusions. 
 
The arguments I will push against extensionalism only apply to that view at the 
shorter time scale, because temporal illusions are not in effect at larger time scales. 
And so I will say nothing against the possibility of a hybrid view that embraces the 
B-ish TEM at the sub-200 msec scale, and A-ish extensionalism at the larger scale. 
 
 
4 The Problem of Surplus Content 
 
An objection that Dainton has raised against retentionalist views in general, and 
which will apply to the TEM at the small scale, is what he calls the problem of 
surplus content. I will frame the problem in the terminology of my own view, but 
how it generalizes to retentionalist accounts generally should be clear. 
 
On the TEM, the perceptual system grasps contents that concern a temporal 
interval of 200 msec or so. I have already explained that these perceptual states need 
not manifest instantaneously, but the idea is that they probably manifest in less than 
200 msec. Just to get some numbers for ease of exposition, let’s say that every 20 
msec a new estimate of the 200 msec interval is produced. And this state persists for 
                                           6	  Lee	  (2014)	  briefly	  mentions	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  view	  similar	  to	  the	  first	  sort	  I	  mention	  here,	  but	  dismisses	   it	   because	   he	   feels	   that	   his	   arguments	   against	   extensionalism/molecularism	  preclude	   any	  such	  hybrid	  account.	  Even	  if	  successful,	  Lee’s	  argument	  wouldn’t	  preclude	  a	  hybrid	  account	  that	  didn’t	  make	  use	  of	  extensionalism/molecularism,	  such	  as	  the	  second	  possibility	  I	  discuss.	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20 msec., at which point it is replaced by its sucessor. If this is so, then over a course 
of one second of objective clock time, the perceptual system will produce 50 separate 
trajectory estimates, each constituting a grasp of 200 msec. of temporal content. The 
math says that on this account the perceptual system is producing a total of ten 
seconds worth of content every second! And this is Dainton’s reductio conclusion. 
Any view according to which perceptual episodes manifest over an interval shorter 
than the interval their content concerns will be a target of this objection. As Dainton 
puts it (using different numbers, but the problem is the same):  
 
Let us suppose … that the apparent duration of the specious present is 
approximately one second. According to the Retentionalist we are experiencing 
this much apparent change at each and every instant. It follows that over the 
course of one second vastly more than one second of change features in our 
experience: an infinite quantity if specious presents are densely packed, but even 
if we suppose there are only a hundred specious presents packed into each 
second, there will be more than a minute of experienced change per second. But 
where is this additional content? Over a one second period, aren’t we typically 
aware of just one second of change? An account which generates significant 
quantities of surplus-to-requirements phenomenal content may not be incoherent, 
but it has a severe plausibility problem, to say the least. (p. 377) 
 
According to the TEM, what is happening at each perceptual episode is the 
grasping of 200 msec worth of temporality in B-ish terms. One grasps that there were 
n events, standing in relations of earlier-than, simultaneous-with, and later-than, 
with each other, such that the temporal distance between the earliest and the latest 
is about 200 msec. It is a small-scale version of the view that Spinoza’s God has on 
the history of the universe sub specie aeternitatis.  And as with Spinoza’s God, the 
appreciation of the temporality of this interval does not require a special or 
perspectival now-point that progresses through the interval.  
 
It is worth saying a bit about these two different ways – the now-bound and the 
divine – of appreciating temporality. Consider a current process that we are 
experiencing, such as the melting of the polar ice caps. For us finite beings, our 
experience of temporality involves a now-point to which our experience is tied, and 
our experience of temporally extended events such as this involves the progression of 
this now-point through the relevant interval – a progression that takes as much time 
as the length of the experienced interval itself. We are experiencing the melting of 
the polar ice caps, precisely because we occupy a now-point that is progressing 
through the same temporal interval as this event. Things are different for Spinoza’s 
God. He takes in the event at a glance. God is not experiencing the melting. It would 
be much better (though still not entirely felicitous) to say that God simply 
experiences it (perhaps better: knows it) – along with everything else in the history 
of the universe – all ‘at once’. 
 
Of course, if in order to experience a 200 msec interval one needs to A-ishly 
progress through it by surfing the cusp of a now-point, a problem of surplus content 
will be easy to generate for any theory that maintains that this can be done in 
substantially less than 200 msec. And especially if the theory claims that this is done 
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50 times a second! We would have to engage in ten seconds’ worth of now-point 
surfing every second.  
 
But what should we say of a being that grasps the 200 msec interval B-ishly, all 
at a glance? And what should we say if there are successive ‘glances’ at these 
intervals that partially overlap? How do we sum successive overlapping takes on the 
same thing? There are two ways to do the accounting. Perhaps an analogy will help. 
 
When Zamboni drivers resurface the ice in a rink, they drive in ovals which 
overlap. The reason for the overlap is that it is important that all of the ice be 
resurfaced, but driving precision isn’t tight enough to guarantee that subsequent 
swaths of resurfacing will exactly abut such that no unresurfaced ice remains 
between swaths without overlap. As a result, some parts of the rink are resurfaced 
more than once. To get some numbers, let’s assume that on each loop, there is a 20% 
overlap with the previous swath of resurfacing.  
 
One could ask the following question: how much ice was resurfaced during a 
complete Zamboniing session? A standard hockey rink is about 1580 square meters. 
So in one very straight-forward sense, 1580 square meters of ice was resurfaced. On 
the other hand, we have a two-meter-wide resurfacing blade, oriented perpendicularly 
to its direction of motion, that travelled for 948 meters, yielding 1896 square meters 
of resurfaced ice.  
 
Now clearly we have not produced a reductio argument against the possibility of 
Zamboniing, by demonstrating that if a rink were Zambonied, then 1580 = 1896. 
Rather, we’ve unearthed a harmless ambiguity in how we might sum overlapping 
magnitudes. On the one hand, we can reckon the summable magnitude with respect 
to the Zambonied entity, i.e. the ice rink. On the other hand, we can recon the 
summable magnitude with respect to the thing doing the Zamboniing. In the former 
case we have 1580 square meters of ice in the rink, and all and only that ice was 
resurfaced. In the latter case 1896 square meters of resurfacing was done.  
 
So the question is, according to the TEM, how much experiencing takes place per 
second? Here is one answer: On the TEM, the experiencing occurs in 20msec blocks 
(say, I’ll use the same numbers assumed in the previous section), and there are 50 of 
those per second. So on the TEM there is 1000 msec of experiencing per second. The 
math checks out. No surplus experiencing is going on. 
 
Here is another answer: On the TEM, since each episode constitutes a grasp of 
200 msec of temporal content, and there are 50 of these per second, during each 
second ten second’s worth of temporal content is grasped. 
 
But this by itself doesn’t generate a problem. True, we have multiple overlapping 
graspings of this one seconds’ worth of temporal content. But we can get from that 
to problematic surplus content, as far as I can tell, in one of two routes, neither of 
which yields a sustianable objection to the TEM proponent.  
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First, one could maintain that the only way to experience 200 msec of temporal 
content would be by riding an experiential now-point through those 200 msec. I agree 
that this would immeuately generate a problem. But because the TEM claims that 
these grasped contents are B-ish, this does not apply. God’s experience of the lifetime 
of the universe takes no time; and our experience of the 200 msec. is similarly 
atemporal – sub specie short-intervalatis, so to speak. The grasping of the 200 msec. 
of temporal content happens at a glance, and does not require traversing 200 msec. of 
perceptual now-point. 
 
The other route would be to insist that the only correct way to sum the contents 
is by double-counting the overlaps. But I can see no reason why the sum must 
proceed this way. And if this is supposed to be a threat to TEM, surely there needs 
to be an argument as to why we have to count in this way. We can do it that way if 
one insists, but as far as I can see the problem that would result is no more troubling 
than the problem of surplus ice. 
 
Indeed, we could generate an exactly analogous problem for binocular vision. 
When looking at a one meter oak board, if my right eye sees one meter of oak, and 
my  left eye also sees one meter of oak, then I could, in some sense, claim that I am 
seeing two meters of oak. While I could do this, why would I want to? It seems that 
the right thing to say is that I see one meter of oak, even though my seeing of it is 
redundant. But the redundance shouldn’t be used as a reason to sum the magnitudes 
separately. What I am seeing (redundantly) is the one meter board. Similarly, what I 
am percieiving is the on second of change. I am perceiving it reduncdantly, in that 
each phase is perceived by me on multiple occassions.  
 
And so as I have shown, on the TEM there is one second of experiencing per 
second. And there is also one second’s worth of change that is (redundantly) 
experienced every second. The math works out. As far as I can tell, the only way to 
generate a problem is either to insist that experience must invovle surfing a now-
point (which the TEM denies, because it posits B-ish contents at the small scale), or 
insist on summing magnitudes in a way that would also, and quite objectionably, 
have me seeing two meters of oak every time I look at a one meter oak board with 
both eyes open. Neither of these strikes me as high percentage. 
 
 
5 Temporal Illusions and Extensionalism 
 
Part of the plausibility of the TEM rests on objections that have been leveled 
against views of its type. Another part depends on the extent to which competitors 
are seen as plausible. My goal in this section is to show that, at least as applied to 
the sub-200 msec scale, extensionalist models face serious challenges. I will be 
pushing the argument from temporal illusion. Extensionalists are familiar with this 
general sort of objection, as I raised them  (Grush 2007, 2008) against Dainton’s 
view. I will expand on the argument from temporal illusion by showing not only that 
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it has more force against Dainton’s view than he recognizes, but also showing how it 
presents a serious challenge to the views of Hoerl (2009) and Phillips (2014) as well.   
 
The basic argument can be summarized fairly quickly. Consider a temporal 
interval from t1 to t3 during which a subject is looking at a blank computer screen in 
a dark room. At t1 a light flashes at location A on the computer monitor, and at t3 (a 
hundred milliseconds or so after t1) a second light flashes at a location to the right of 
the first flash, location C. This is just the standard apparent motion stimulus 
condition. 
 
As perceptual processing progresses, there will be a point at which the 
information processing responsible for the experience of the first flash is complete, 
this will be the time that the flash actually appears plus the required processing time 
d. So at time t1+d, the subject’s perceptual system will have received and had time 
to process information from the first flash. But let’s consider the time t2+d, and ask 
ourselves, what percept is the perceptual system producing at this time? At t2, the 
first dot has flashed, and given way to a black screen. The amount of time it takes 
for information to be processed about the flash on the screen and the return to black 
has elapsed by t2+d. But the second dot has not yet appeared. It would be natural to 
say that what is experienced at t2+d is the empty black screen. And perhaps this 
black screen is even experienced as having just supplanted an isolated flash, though 
this is not crucial for the argument. 
 
When we get to t3, the second dot flashes, and at t3+d the time it takes for 
information about the second flash to make its influence on perceptual processing has 
elapsed. And we know that in this situation, people perceive the event not as two 
isolated flashes – at location A at t1 and at location C at t3 – but rather as a dot 
moving continuously from A through B to C.  
 
But – and here is the puzzle – it seems that in order to see the scene as one of 
continuous motion from A through B and on to C, the perceptual system must 
represent the first flash not as followed by an empty black screen at t2, but as 
followed by a stimulus moving away from A through B towards C, and in particular 
with the stimulus at B at t2. So it would seem that experience is presenting both i) 
the first flash followed by a completely black screen, and ii) an initial stimulus that 
starts at A and continues through B. These two possible contents are obviously 
incompatible.  
 
Here is one way to handle the problem: the perceptual system produced a 
representation of the black screen at t2+d but this representation was soon replaced 
by a different interpretation (of a moving dot) without memory of the first 
representation. But prima facie (see below for more) the extensionalist cannot make 
use of this reply. It is the actual progression of my perceptual experience, between 
t1+d and t3+d, that explains my experience of that temporal interval, according to 
the extensionalist. So whatever I actually experienced at t2+d is part of that 
experience.  
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Moreover, if over-writing could solve the problem, then the extensionalist would 
be admitting that in this case, a current perception at t3+d, plus a currently 
produced and grasped (false) memory (at t3+d) of there having been a moving dot at 
t2+d would explain our experience of the motion at t3+d. But this possibility just is 
standard retentionalism., the idea that the experience of a temporal interval is an 
amalgam of a current percept plus memories (retentions) of what just preceded. The 
extensionalist must avoid appeal to memories (false or veridical) as sufficient, when 
combined with a current perception, to explain the experience of motion on pain of 
becoming a closet retentionalist. The extentionalist must appeal only to the actual 
temporally extended stream of experience from at least t1+d through t3+d.  
 
With overwriting ruled out, there have been three extensionalist proposals 
concerning how to deal with temporal illusions. The first is delayed extensionalism – 
the option embraced by (Dainton 2008).  Second, Hoerl (2009) argues that we can 
attribute to the subject at t2+d an experiential content that is ‘neutral’, with the 
neutrality resolved some time after t3+d. Finally Phillips (2014) maintains that we 
can attribute to experience a content at t2+d that is determinate (not neutral, pace 
Hoerl) and not delayed (pace Dainton), but which depends on facts concerning what 
happens after t2+d. Note that the TEM avoids this problem because it explicitly 
embraces the ability to over-write past experiences. 
 
 
5.1 Dainton’s view: delayed extensionalism 
 
Dainton has claimed  that the problem can be solved by recognizing a delay in 
the processing. As Dainton puts it: 
 
We can agree that experiences cannot have inconsistent contents. But it would 
be wrong to suppose the Extensional theorist has no option but to interpret such 
cases in this way. Grush seems to be assuming that the contents featuring in 
Extensional specious presents reflect their environmental causes in an immediate 
and entirely unmediated manner. But there is no need for Extensionalists to 
embrace this view of the perceptual process. It is arguably more plausible to 
construe perceptual contents as representations that are generated in the brain 
only after a good deal of processing. This processing makes for a delay—50-100 
msec, say—but our brains put this to good use: they try to work out a single, 
coherent version of events on the basis of the fragmentary and (at times) 
conflicting data available to them. Only this ‘final draft’, as it were, reaches 
consciousness. Hence in the phi case, our perceptual systems reach the (in fact 
erroneous) conclusion that A is in fact a moving light, and this is the only way in 
which it features in our experience. While the initial solitary, static A-flash may 
well register in our perceptual systems, it does so only at a pre-conscious level. 
Since this flash in this form is not experienced, the problem of inconsistent 
perceptual contents does not arise. (Dainton 2008, pp. 381-2) 
 
 
I agree that this will get around the problem of contradictory contents. But this 
solution comes at a higher cost than Dainton realizes.  
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5.1.1 The cost of delay 
 
Before beginning, a clarificatory point needs to be made. In order for a delay to 
solve the problem it must be a delay over and above the minimal delay required for 
perceptual processing. Whatever minimal delay the sensory information from the 
earlier event is subject to (we have been calling this d) applies equally to information 
from the later event. Supposing the later event (e.g., the second flash) occurs at t3, 
then this information won’t be in a position to make any postdictive difference to 
anything until t3+d at the earliest. This is not nearly as innocent as the claim, made 
by Dainton after pointing out that all perceptual processing unavoidably takes time, 
that the perceptual system “puts this delay to good use” suggests. That phrase 
makes it sound as though the time period required for processing the initial stimulus 
information can serve as the delay period required for retrodictive processing – that 
the brain is just multitasking for that same delay period. This is not the case, 
however. That is, if, as Dainton suggests, “… the initial solitary, static A-flash may 
well register in our perceptual systems, it does so only at a pre-conscious level” it needs to 
be exmphasized that on this proposal, the subject can only become aware of the A-flash at 
t3+d. The subject’s experience is delayed, and Eagleman’s claim that we are living in 
the past is embraced. 
 
Next, it needs to be emphasized that the perceptual system does not ever know 
in advance if it is in a situation such that data received after an event will be 
relevant to the perceptual interpretation of that event. In order to know this, it 
would have to look into the future and know, for instance, that a second flash is 
coming up, and so processing should be delayed concering this first flash to take 
account of it. But obviously if it could know this, then it could use this clairvoyance 
to solve the problem directly without delay. This means that on any view that posts 
a delay to address temporal illusions, the perceptual system must be continually 
maintaining a perceptual delay, in every modality, every waking moment, just for 
those relatively few situations in which a delay will afford a better interpretation.  
 
It would be difficult to quantify the costs and benefits here. By my lights, the 
introduction of an additional 80-100 msec delay, in all modalities, 24/7, seems like a 
fairly hefty price. And while there is the benefit of better interpretations from time 
to time, it’s tough to put a number on how much better, how often, and how useful 
these better interpretations are. My own sense is that this benefit it is much smaller 
than the cost. (This is one reason I endorse the TEM, which has all of the benefit of 
retrodiction but none of the cost. The cost-benefit accounting is much more straight-
forward in those conditions.) But I recognize that intuitions on this could vary 
widely. 
 
Why are ubiquitous perceptual processing delays a bad thing? We believe that 
we execute actions based on our conscious perceptual experience. And much of our 
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daily behavior is such that normal performance involves acting on the basis of 
sensory input within latencies that don’t seem to allow for this sort of delay – when 
playing many sports, for example. We would seem be forced to admit that conscious 
perceptual experience is, in a way, epiphenomenal, at least with respect to events at 
a fast time scale. The defender of delayed extensionalism (or the smoothing model) 
might reply by saying that motor control in this short time frame could be 
accomplished by subconscious processes that make use of perceptual representations 
that are not delayed. The delay applies only to something like what gets passed 
along to conscious experience. 
 
But this would be an odd response to make, since if there’s any point at all to 
positing a purposeful delay in order to arrive at a superior interpretation of 
environmental happenings, it is that this superior interpretation will result in better 
behavioral guidance. But this response is admitting that that behavior is governed by 
something (unconscious processes) that isn’t getting this benefit; and moreover that 
the thing that is getting this benefit (conscious experience) can’t do anything with 
the benefit because it is delayed out of the relevant causal loop. If the delay isn’t 
aiding the mechanism that could benefit from it, but is only aiding a mechanism that 
can’t benefit from it, then what in heaven’s name is the point?  
 
 
5.1.2 The requirements of retrodictive processing 
 
The TEM does not face the costs just itemized, and so all else being equal it 
would seem like it should be the preferred approach. But the proponent of delayed 
extensionalism will claim that all else is not equal, that the TEM is computationally 
expensive and requires a lot of fancy processing. Enough, perhaps, that 
extensionalism might still on balance be the better choice.  
 
It is true that when I have presented the TEM (Grush 2005, 2007) there has been 
a good deal of math in order to specify the processing requirements. By contrast, all 
that the smoothing model and delayed extensionalism do is to ‘delay processing to be 
able to take account of information from events that occur after the perceived event’. 
And that sounds easy enough.  But appearances are deceiving. Failing to be explicit 
about (or cognizant of) the required complexity of a process does not render that 
process any less complex. And in fact, smoothing and delayed extensionalism require 
all of the information processing machinery that is needed by the TEM. They just 
put this machinery to far less efficient use.  
 
Let me explain. Perception, as standardly understood, is a process that starts 
with raw sensory information transduced (usually) at the periphery, and results in a 
percept that is as of the environment or some object in, or feature of, it. To put it in 
schematic terms that are intended to be uncontroversial, perception requires that 
there be some knowledge or expectations about what the environment is like and 
what sorts of things generally happen in the environment, and these are used to 
Rick Grush Temporal character and scale non-invariance April 2016  
 19 
interpret sensory input. Stimulation of the visual sensory surfaces is limited to two-
dimensional patterns of light, but what we perceptually experience are chairs and 
tractors and the dog’s pursuit of the ball – things that are not transduced at the 
sensory surface, but rather supplied by the perceptual system.  
 
Apparent motion is a reflection of these expectations: the perceptual system 
evidently thinks that a single moving object is more likely to be the cause of the 
sensory information than two distinct but successive bright stimuli in close spatial 
and temporal proximity. Most perceptual illusions are the result of such top-down 
expectations in this way. What makes this sort of thing necessary is the relative 
paucity of peripheral sensory information and its noisiness. In signal processing 
terms, this process is often called filtering. It can sound fancy, but all it means is a 
process by which expectations are used to interpret sensory signals – roughly, those 
things that better fit expectations are more likely to be signal, and those which do 
not are more likely to be noise.  We see the Neckar cube as a cube because our 
perceptual system takes it that that sort of 3D object is a more likely cause of that 
stimulus pattern than 12 co-planar line segments. 
 
Now let’s turn to retrodiction, aka smoothing. This is a process by which 
information gathered after some event is used to help arrive at a better idea of what 
that event was. But how can information from t2 help us to know what was 
happening at t1? The only way is expectations about how the environment (or 
perceived/represented) system is likely to evolve over time. Many of these 
expectations are so banal that it is easy to overlook their necessity and even 
existence. When I open my eyes at t2 to see the bowling ball rolling towards the pins, 
I can know that it was very recently (t1) thrown by the person standing at the top of 
the lane because I have expectations to the effect that i) bowling balls don’t pop into 
existence randomly; ii) they tend to travel in straight lines. And accordingly one can 
get an idea of where they came from based on knowledge of a chunk of their current 
path. That is, one can use current information to help determine what happened in 
the past, but only because of expectations about the kinds of things that typiucally 
occur. Without a lot of expectations about how the perceived entities typically 
behave, retrodiction would be impossible.  
 
So in order to do retrodiction at t2 concerning what happened at t1, I need to 
have two things: first, an idea of what the current situation is at t2; and second an 
idea of how this sort of system behaves over time. And then I use the second piece of 
information to, so to speak, backtrack from the current situation to a guess as to 
what the prior situation was. I then use both i) the percept that was produced at t1, 
and ii) the back-tracked guess, produced at t2, concerning what must have happened 
at t1, to decide on the best interpretation of what was happening at t1. This might 
require over-writing the original t1 estimate, maybe averaging them, or going with 
the original one despite what later information suggested. Which route is taken 
depends on a number of factors. The points I want to emphasize now are that the 
backtracking to the better interpretation of what was happening at t1 i) starts with 
an interpretation of the current situation at t2, not just the raw unprocessed 
information caused by the situation at t2; and ii) it requires expectations about what 
sorts of events are to be expected in the environment.  
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Next, note that these very same ingredients – a current perceptual state 
indicating the current situation and expectations about how the things typically 
behave – are sufficient to generate predictions of future states of the environment. 
This is self-explanatory.   
 
To summarize so far: the smoothing model and delayed extensionalism require i) 
the ability to produce percepts of the current situation, and ii) expectations about 
how events typically unfold. They use these ingredients to actually produce an 
estimate of the current situation as well as an estimate of prior events that lead up 
to the current situation. They could easily use these ingredients to produce 
predictions of future stages of currently perceived processes, but the models don’t 
make use of this ability.  
 
Now let’s look at the TEM. It maintains that the perceptual system constructs 
estimates of the behavior, over a period of time from a brief interval in the past to a 
brief interval into the future, of the perceived environment (here ‘past’ and ‘future’ 
are descriptions of the extent of the interval with reference to the time that the 
perceptual state is produced, it is not a characterization of the character of the 
temporal content of that state, of course). What this requires is an ability to 
generate estimates of current states of the environment (perception), expectations 
about how the environment typically behaves to produce both estimates of the past 
states of the environment, and also estimates of its future states. Put them all 
together, and you have a trajectory estimate. That is, the TEM and the smoothing 
model/delayed extensionalism both require the same computational power, and both 
use that power to produce representations of the most current environmental state as 
well as representations of what prior events resulted in the currently perceived 
events. Only the TEM maintains that the machinery is also used to produce 
predictions of future stages of perceived happenings. 
 
In what do they differ, then? The TEM maintains that the entire trajectory 
estimate is part of conscious experience, and also that the entire estimate is available 
to guide behavior, even by sub- or pre-conscious processes. 
Extensionalism/smoothing model place a limit either on what is presented to 
conscious experience, or what is available to guide behavior, or both. I have remarks 
above that indicate the main problems with this (in 5.1.1). The point is that despite 
the fact that the proponents’ desription of the process of benefitting from delay 
sounds easy and computationally cheap, it isn’t any less expensive than the TEM.  
 
 
5.2 Hoerl’s view: non-delayed ‘neutral’ content 
 
The question concerns what the subject perceives after the first flash, but before 
the second flash (if there is a second flash). The challenge was that it seems that the 
subject must experience the isolated flash at t2+d, but then this is inconsistent with 
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what we know the subject will perceive if the second flash is presented at t3. There 
are two components to Hoerl’s view. Notice that in the discussion below of Hoerl’s 
view we will be switchng the time indicies of the flashes from t1  and t3 with a blank 
screen at t2, to t4 and t6 with a blank screen at t5. The reason for adding 3 to each 
index will be apparent shortly. Note also that Hoerl’s expression for extentionalism is 
‘molecularism’, for current purposes we can treat them as synonymous. The first 
component of Hoerl’s response is this: 
 
I think the most promising strategy for the molecularist to adopt, in response to 
this objection, is to insist that experiences can’t be sliced arbitrarily finely. In 
other words, there is a limit to the fineness of grain, as it were, of the temporal 
phenomena we can make out perceptually. … If there are such thresholds, 
though, the molecularist does not need to accept the crucial idea behind [this] 
criticism, that the overall temporal experience of what happens between t4 and t6, 
as conceived by the molecularist, must have as a proper part a further temporal 
experience, viz., of what happens between t4 and t5 . (Hoerl 2009, p. 10) 
 
The idea here is that if there is a minimal temporal duration of experience that 
can count as experience, then perhaps the extansionalist (aka molecularist) can deny 
that it makes sense for us to ask after what is happening the time between flashes. 
What ever is happening in thiss short a time-frame is too short to count as an 
experience.  
 
To this two responses could be made. First, supposing this is true, then it would 
seem to be a version of Dainton’s delayed extentionalism, but just posited for 
different reasons: at t5 (the time between flashes) not enough time has elapsed for the 
experience to count as an experience. But by t6 it will.  
 
The second reply is one that Hoerl credits to an anonymous referee. It is this: 
let’s not consider the interval from t4 to t5, but rather from t1 to t5. We can now ask: 
what was the subject experiencing at t5? And now Hoerl can’t reply that the interval 
of experience isn’t large enough to count as an experience, since we can make that 
interval as large as we please. (This is why we switched index numbering.) To this 
Hoerl replies: 
 
In my view, this objection relies on the same problematic step …. The only thing 
that could motivate the claim that this experience must be as of a period with a 
stationary stimulus occurring at the end is the idea that it has as a proper part a 
further temporal experience, of what happens between t4 and t5. (Hoerl 2009, p. 
11) 
 
Suppose I am watching a parade with seven floats, and each float goes past me at 
t1, t2, …, t7.  And let us suppose that any three successive time steps is sufficiently 
long to count as an experience. Whatever the minimum experience length is, just set 
the indices so that that much time is covered in any three successive time steps. So t1 
- t3 is long enough for an experience, as is t4 - t6. Here are some things that strike me 
as true: i) my experience spanning t1 - t3 does not include experience of the 4
th float; 
ii) my experience spanning t1 - t4 does include experience of the 4
th float; my 
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experience spanning t4 - t6 does include experience of the 4
th float; but my experience 
spanning t5 - t7 does not include that experience.  
 
What this suggests is the following: consider an extended chunk of my experience 
that includes t4. It something about my experience at t4 that is selectively responsible 
for the fact that my experience over the longer interval containing t4 includes 
experience of the 4th float. (This is a really fancy way of stating something that is 
pretty plausible pre-thyeoretically.) Note that this principle does not require the 
further claim that the chunk of experiencing that is happening at t4 could, by itself, 
count as an experience. Identifying which temporal parts of an experience might be 
selectively responsible for certain contents being present in an extended chunk of 
experience does not require one to think that that part could, by itself, count as an 
experience. And it seems to me that the weaker claim is all that the anonymous 
referee’s point requires. And this does not require the assumption that Hoerl finds 
problematic. 
 
Now to what I see as Hoerl’s main response: 
 
The segment of experience might be such that it does not distinguish between a 
stationary stimulus occurring at its end, and the onset of a movement of a 
stimulus occurring at its end. In other words, the molecularist can argue that any 
segment of experience occurring before [t3+d] will be neutral as to whether what 
is experienced at its end is a stationary stimulus or the onset of a movement of a 
stimulus; that neutrality is removed only at [t3+d]. (Hoerl 2009, p. 11) 
 
Note that I have switched the indices back to the ones used in the prior 
discussion. What can it mean to say that experience is ‘neutral’ or ‘does not 
distinguish between’ i) an isolated stationary stimulus that elapsed leaving only 
blackness and ii) a bright stimulus moving across the screen? It seems that there are 
two ways to go. First, it might mean that there is no substantive content at all. 
Second, it might mean that there is substantive content, but that it is subject to 
more than one interpretation, namely, the two interpretations that it is neutral 
between. An example is the visual appearance of a Neckar cube, which has a content, 
but is ambiguous because this content could be interpreted in a three ways (perhaps 
more, but there are three that are most common). Perhaps with some measure of 
expressive license this could be described as the 12 co-planar line segments being 
“neutral” between the two possible cube percepts. 
 
It is clear that Hoerl has in mind something like the second interpretation. In any 
case, if he had in mind something like the first, then the position would collapse to 
Dainton’s delayed extensionalism since there would be no content until after the 
second flash, and my remarks concerning delayed extensionalism would apply. On 
the other hand, I don’t think the position interpreted as positing neutrality 
understood as ambiguity is tenable. In order to be an adequate way of conceiving of 
things, the neutrality will have to be between all possible eventual perceptual 
contents. Hoerl’s discussion focused on two possibilities — an isolated flash and a dot 
moving from A to C — undoubtedly because he was responding to my discussion in 
(Grush 2008), and these were the two possibilities I focused on. In my case, the two 
Rick Grush Temporal character and scale non-invariance April 2016  
 23 
options were enough for the point I was trying to make. But they are not enough for 
Hoerl’s point. 
 
What are the possible interpretations the perceptual system might land on, at 
t3+d, concerning what is happening just after the first flash, at t2? We have seen 
two: a black screen that just displaced an image of a flashing dot, and a moving dot 
at location B that just left location A and is headed for C. But the description of the 
second possibility is deceptive. The second dot could flash in a location any direction 
relative to the first. The motion could be upward, leftward, rightward or downward. 
Indeed, there are a very large number of possible discernible directions. How many 
precisely is a question for psychophysics, but essentially as many motion trajectories 
as there are discriminable locations for the terminal flash. Dozens at a minimum. 
Perhaps hundreds.  
 
And the possibilities expand further when we recognize that the color of the 
second flash will also influence the interpretation of what happens along the 
trajectory, since when the two circles differ in color, the illusory moving circle is seen 
as changing color before the terminus. If we multiply the discernible locations by 
discernible colors, we see that the ambiguity of the post-flash percept is high indeed, 
into the thousands at least. The percept must be neutral between motion in any 
direction, and a transition to any color.  
 
And it has also been found that the shape of the second flash affects what is seen 
along the trajectory, with an initial circular stimulus morphing continuously into the 
square shape of the terminal stimulus, for example (Kolers and von Grünau, 1976). It 
is unclear what the limits are for this sort of transition (will a disc morph 
continuously into the shape of a six-legged elephant?). We may be into six figures by 
now, perhaps much higher. Worse still, if the stimulus presented at t3 is a mask, the 
percept could be one of no initial flashing disc at all!   
 
I’m unsure what to make of the suggestion that my perceptual experience at t2+d 
concerning what is happening at t2 is a) substantive in the sense that it is not just a 
lack of content waiting out a delay period as per Dainton’s position, but b) neutral 
between there being an isolated flashing disk, there not being a flashing disk at all, 
there being a flashing green disc that is starting to morph into the shape of a 
periwinkle banana while moving down and slightly to the left, and so forth for 
several hundred thousand (at least) trajectories with the flashing disk as an initiator. 
Even with two possibilities my grip on what this was supposed to mean was shaky. 
But now I fear I’ve no traction on the suggestion whatsoever. It is also puzzling what 
possible use it could be for the perceptual system to go through the trouble of 
producing that sort of strange neutral percept. Especially when the equally or more 
useful option of producing no percept at all — that is, delaying — is right there. 
 
 
5.3 Phillips’ view: ‘future-dependent’ experience 
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Ian Phillips (2014) makes the following response in defense of extensionalism 
(note that his example is the cutaneous rabbit, and not apparent motion): 
 
… if a subject’s experience at a time is logically dependent on facts about 
experience at later times, we cannot say what a subject is experiencing 
immediately after the second pulse without taking into account facts about her 
later experience, and in particular whether she goes on to experience a sixth 
pulse or not. In consequence, a subject may have different experiences of the 
second pulse’s location – without need for delay or over-writing – because such 
experiences constitutively depend on facts about later experience. (Phillips, 2014, 
p. 136.) 
 
To summarize: There is experience at t2 (the second pulse), and the question is 
whether it has feature X or feature Y — this could be the experience’s being as of an 
isolated flash vs. the initial stage of a moving dot, or it could be a tap felt at the 
wrist vs a tap felt a few centimeters proximal to the wrist. We are told that this 
might depend (logically) upon something that occurs at t3. For example, if E1 occurs 
at t3, then experience will have feature X, but if E2 occurs at t3, then experience will 
have feature Y. 
 
5.3.1 Marty McFly and game-winning shots 
 
The rarified metaphysical air of various sorts of dependence (logical and 
otherwise) is a bit much for me. I will rather pitch my discussion in terms of a 
distinction between two exhaustive (I believe) sorts of dependence, namely the sort 
of dependence that yields (1) below, and the sort that yields (2):  
 
1. The feature that is determined at t2, by the fact at t3, is such that it is able to 
make a causal difference to events that occur between t2 and t3.  
 
2. The feature that is determined at t2, by the fact at t3, is such that it is able to 
make no causal difference to events that occur between t2 and t3. 
 
So understand dependence any way you like, then just see which of (1) or (2) is 
true of it, and then continue reading. Cases of the no-causal-relevance sort (2) are 
easy to imagine. Suppose that in the closing minutes of a basketball game Team A is 
behind Team B by one point. Team A then makes a layup, which gives them a one-
point lead. Whether this layup is the game winning shot depends on facts about 
happenings after that shot is made. Specifically, if Team B never recovers the lead 
and so team A wins, then that shot was the game winner. If Team B does recover 
the lead – whether or not Team A gets it back again, and regardless of which team 
wins – then that shot was not the game winner. Being the game-winning shot is a 
sort of post-hoc honorific. 
 
Here is a clear case where facts concerning happenings in the future with respect 
to some event determine a feature of that event. But it this feature –being the game 
winning shot – is clearly causally inert until the determining events have transpired. 
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And since these events don’t transpire until the final buzzer sounds, a shot’s being 
the game-winner is a causally inert feature of that shot until after the buzzer sounds. 
For suppose that it were not, that it had some causal potency. Then we would have 
a convenient method for cutting dead time off the end of basketball games. Any time 
a team takes the lead with a shot, just determine at that time whether the relevant 
causal power is present — and causal powers are the sorts of things whose presence is 
detectable, via their effects. And if we detect this causal power, then we have 
determined that it was the game-winning shot, and we can end the game early. We 
will know that the team that made that shot will not lose the lead for the rest of the 
game. Now clearly this this isn’t possible. And this is because this feature has no 
relevant causal powers. 
 
I will call features (or properties, or whatever) of this (2) sort, features 
determined by facts concerning events in the future of the feature, but which lack 
causal relevance for anything before those determining events,  game-winning 
features. Such features may have consequences for things after the determining 
events, of course. Whether a player is inducted into the hall of fame, or named 
player-of-the-game, may well depend on whether that player made the game-winning 
shot as such. It might cause me to lose a bet on who would make the game winning 
shot. But I wouldn’t know whether I won or lost until after the final buzzer, of 
course.  
 
Cases of the causally-relevant (1) sort are easy to imagine, at least in science 
fiction. When Marty McFly starts playing the guitar in 1955 at the big dance, his 
arm begins to fade out, thus making it difficult for him to play. The fading out and 
then back in is having clear causal consequences at the time, most notably with 
respect to his ability to play his guitar. And the degree of fade-out, and hence his 
control over his arm, is being determined by an event in the future relative to his 
guitar playing, namely, his parents getting married and having Marty as one of their 
children (or not). An event in the future with respect to Marty’s guitar playing is 
retroactively wiping him from existence, one limb at a time, and this is having causal 
consequences at the time. Let’s call features such as this McFly features.  
 
Let’s return to the case at hand. The first flash occurred at t1, the second flash 
will occur at t3. The challenge was that the extensionalist has no good answer to the 
question concerning the nature of perceptual experience at t2+d, the time at which 
information about events up to t2 has been processed by the perceptual mechanisms. 
The response is that we are now considering is that it is possible to say something 
about experience at t2+d, because the experience at this time (or more carefully, the 
extended experiential episode that has so far progressed up to t2+d) can have 
features that are logically dependent on things that happen at t3 or later. We don’t 
need to delay, or revise our assessment of, any features at t2. So far so good: re-
writing would involve embracing the sufficiency of retentionalism as I argued above, 
and a delay would collapse it to Dainton’s delayed retentionalism. So we are being 
promised a genuine extensionalism that solves the problem without delay.  
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The question is, is this feature of experience at t2+d a game-winning feature (2), 
or is it a McFly feature (1)? The problem is that those options are exhaustive, and 
neither is viable. McFly features require us to play fast and loose with physical law. I 
take this to be uncontroversial enough so that I can drop that horn without risking 
accusations of progressing unfairly. But game-winning features lack causal relevance. 
And content – phenomenal or subconscious – is the sort of thing that must have 
causal relevance.    
 
Why should we worry about whether the determined feature has causal 
relevance? Well, a couple of different considerations come to mind. First, if this 
feature of experience is not causally relevant, then all motivation for its accuracy 
immediately goes poof. As does any premium on its timeliness. If it has no causal 
relevance, why would the perceptual system go though the trouble, rather than just 
delaying?  
 
Second, it is not at all obvious what sorts of things could count as perceptual 
content, but lack causal relevance. If there were such things, the following would 
have to be true: there are a pair of contents – say i) the screen is black, and ii) the 
screen has a bright dot moving across it – such that whether I am experiencing (i) or 
(ii) has no causal relevance. For example, I could not be trained to push a button 
when I experience (i) but not (ii); (ii) does not elicit any eye-tracking response for 
the dot I am perceptually experiencing; neither is more likely than, or capable than, 
the other to elicit a verbal response from me to the effect that I just saw motion. 
And so forth. Maybe there is something in the vicinity here worth calling a “feature 
of experience” that I’m just unable to think of. 
 
 
5.3.2 Ambiguity again 
 
Phillips offers some assistance in understanding what he has in mind: 
 
… a simple analogy may help. Facts about what I am doing at some instant may 
depend on what I am doing over some period of time. Thus, whether I am 
walking or running at some instant is not fixed by a snapshot of my posture at 
that instant. Nor indeed is it fixed by what I do over a very brief period, e.g. 
1/10th second, surrounding that instant. This is clear if we consider the 
mechanics of walking. As a textbook puts it, ‘walking can be characterized as an 
alternating sequence of single and double support’ in contrast to, say, running 
which ‘involves alternating sequences of [single] support and nonsupport’ (Enoka, 
2002, p. 179). Thus, a single support phase (which is all that will be going on 
during certain sub-periods of periods of walking) is insufficient an occurrence on 
its own to determine whether someone is walking over that period. Nonetheless, 
someone can be walking or running at some moment in virtue of what they do 
over some extended period of time encompassing that instant. The 
metaphysically basic units of walking are significantly extended in time. The 
same, the Extensionalist should insist, is true of experiencing. (Phillips 2011, p. 
398) 
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This example makes the situation sound more promising for the extensionalists 
than I think it really is. Here is why. It sure seems like the processes of running and 
walking are very different, even to the point of having different causal powers – 
running will get me to the bus before it departs but walking won’t. What could be 
more causally legit than that? And it also seems plausible that there can be 
situations such that whether someone is, at time t2, running or walking, might be 
determined by something that happens at t3. And when you put these two points 
together, the case looks promising. 
 
But there is an ambiguity in Phillips’ example. There are two possibilities: i) the 
body’s dynamical state at t2 – the single support phase – is such that it would be 
difficult or impossible for the second foot to contact the ground before the other foot 
lifts. It is important to consider the dynamical state, including the momentum of the 
parts and torques and tensions on the joints, and not just the instantaneous 
kinematic description of “1 foot on the ground”. An Olympic sprinter at a point in 
time in the middle of a race might have one foot on the ground, but the large 
momenta and forces and torques in play at that time all but determine (modulo 
falling pianos and such) that the planted foot will lift off the ground before the other 
foot lands. The instantaneous kinematic state might be ambiguous, but the 
instantaneous dynamic state is not. And surely when it comes to determining 
whether someone is walking or running at a time, the dynamic state description 
should trump the kinematic state description. The dynamic state description gets the 
right answer when we ask whether the Olympian half way through her race was 
running or walking when the piano fell on her head. The falling piano did, after all, 
force her other foot down to the ground while the first foot was still grounded. But 
her body’s dynamical state at that time were geared towards running. Would we 
really want to say that she was walking when the piano landed on her in the middle 
of the sprint, just because the result forced her second foot down before her first 
lifted from the ground? 
 
Consider the “Froude Number”, defined as (mv2/l)/mg and in algebraically 
reduced form v2/gl, where v is velocity of the locomoting person, g is gravity, and l is 
leg length. This is a quantity determinable at a given instant from dynamical 
features (especially velocity and gravitational acceleration). As Enoka (2002, p. 187) 
explains: “We cannot walk at Froude numbers greater than 1.0, because that would 
mean the centripetal force would exceed the gravitational force. Interestingly, many 
bipeds, including humans and birds, prefer to switch from a walk to a run at a 
Froude number of ≈.05…” So to take but one example of dynamical state trumping 
kinematic state, if you have one foot on the ground (kinematic state), but your 
Froude number is, say, 1.2 (determined by your dynamical state), you cannot be 
walking. Your dynamical state at that time determines that you are, at that 
moment, running. 
 
The other possibility is ii) the body’s dynamical state at t2 really is ambiguous, 
meaning that the person could at t2 start speeding up so that the first foot lifts 
before the other falls, or slow down a bit so that the second falls while the first is still 
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on the ground. That is, even if you knew the dynamical state you would not know if 
that state was part of a running trajectory or a walking trajectory. It is on the cusp 
and could go either way. Perhaps this is the situation at Froude numbers of a bit less 
than .05. 
 
In the first case, while it is true that whether the instantaneous state at t2 is one 
of walking or running might, in some sense, be determined by what happens at t3, it 
is also the case that the relevant event at t3 (the foot lifting before the other touches) 
is caused by the dynamical state at t2. The dynamical state at t2 isn’t really 
indeterminate with respect to running vs. walking at all. 
 
What about the second case, where the locomoting person is in a transitional 
dynamical state that is on the cusp of evolving into either a run or walk? In this case 
it is indeed true that whether this state is a phase of a walking vs. running process 
will be determined by events in the future relative to that state. But exactly because 
of this, the ‘running’ vs ‘walking’ feature in this case is a game-winning feature. The 
instantaneous dynamical state at t2 has exactly the same causal relevance at t2 
whether it gets determined, by the future event, to be a phase of a walking event or 
a running event. Indeed, that is exactly what allows it to be ambiguous. 
 
So while the analogy might have initially seemed helpful, once it is unpacked its 
helpfulness fades. Exactly how a future event can determine an earlier feature 
without backwards causation that isn’t just a game-winning feature is still unclear. 
And how anything that is a mere game-winning feature of experience can plausibly 
count as content is also unclear.  
 
 
6 Discussion 
 
I have tried to accomplish four things. First, I have argued that temporal 
experience may not be scale invariant, and that because of this, there are hybrid 
options potentially available that have not been explored in the literature. Second, I 
have clarified that my own view, the TEM, is meant to apply only at small time 
scales, with the further specification that it attributes B-ish temporal content to 
experience at that scale. It is possible that this view could be combined with more 
standard retentionalist account, or even extensionalist account, of temporal 
experience at larger time scales, perhaps one that attributes in A-ish contents at 
these larger scales. I believe that a standard retentionalist picture at larger time 
scales is probably the way to go, but making that part of the case has been beyond 
the scope of this paper. And I don’t feel like I have a compelling stake in the qustion 
one way or the other. 
 
Third, I have tried to show that the theory I described, the TEM, is not subject 
to Dainton’s surplus content objection. I argued that because the TEM attributes B-
ish content to the relevant experience in such a way that no moving now-point is 
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required to traverse the interval in order to imbue it with temporal content, it is not 
forced to recognize any objectionable surplus content. What would be required to 
force the reductio conclusion would be either i) A-ish contents that required a now-
point to traverse the entire temporal extent of each trajectory estimate, or ii) a 
summing of B-ish intervals that double-counts all overlaps. And the TEM isn’t 
forced to do either. It explicitly denies A-ish contents at that scale, and any counting 
scheme that would require that I claim that I am seeing two meters of oak when 
looking with both eyes at a one meter oak board is independently objectionable, even 
if according to some way of summing magnitudes if could be construed as ‘correct’. 
 
Finally, I have argued that the three main extensionalist theories face a serious 
challenge form the problem of temporal illusions at small time scales, namely the 
scale of around 200 msec, which is where those illusions manifest. Dainton’s delayed 
extensionalism requires all of the machinery of the TEM, but puts that machinery to 
much less efficient use. In particular, it must claim that all experience is constantly 
subject to a delay when there would seem to be no benefit in doing so. Hoerl’s appeal 
to “neutral” experiences either collapses to Dainton’s delayed extensionalism, or is 
positing experiences with quite puzzling and seemingly contradictory contents. 
Philip’s reply would seem to be able to account for game-winning features of 
experience at best, but these don’t seem to be the sorts of features one would want 
from any experiential content worth the name. It is of course possible that despite 
my best efforts at charitability I have not fully understood Dainton’s or Hoerl’s or 
Phillip’s views correctly. In that case, my objections should be read as an invitation 
for clarification and further specification. 
 
Where does all this leave us? My discussion of scale invariance was an attempt to 
clarify the scale at which I intend the TEM to apply and the character of the 
temporal content that the TEM attributes to experience at this scale. This restriction 
of the applicability of the TEM to small temporal scales of less than 200 msec opens 
the possibility of a hybrid view combining the TEM at small temporal scales with 
another view, possibly extensionalism or a different flavor of retentionalism, at larger 
scales. My defense of the TEM against Dainton’s objections are relevant to the TEM 
as applied at small scales. But more to the point, my argument against 
extensionalism – the problem of temporal illusions – applies only to an 
extensionalism taken to apply at brief temporal scales, since it is only at these scales 
that temporal illusions are in effect. An extensionalism that was taken to apply only 
at temporal scales greater than 200 msec or so (but ceded the sub-200 msec scale to 
some other account) would not be subject to that objection.  
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